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MEASURING THE DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
by
Ellen Homig*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1960s, several developments have stimulated econo­
mists' interest in the domestic impact of international trade. Trade 
has gained importance in the U .S. economy , comprising a growing share of 
the gross national product, absorbing an increasing portion of agricultural 
output and, potentially or in actuality, supporting or threatening several 
domestic industries. Though not yet a dominant factor in U.S. economic 
development, trade has become a more prominent issue during a period of 
general economic instability: chronically high inflation and unemployment 
rates are frequently attributed to such trade-related factors as 
import competition, the energy 'crises', and rising commodity prices.
Trade negotiations, under way during most of the past twenty years, have 
brought to the arena of public discussion topics such as slow growth and 
excess capacity in some sectors of industrialized nations, increasing 
export capacity in developing countries, and trade adjustment assistance.
As the manipulation of trade policy continues under public scrutiny, dis­
tribution of the burdens and benefits of trade naturally attracts attention.
Just as interest in international trade has grown, so has the body of 
theoretical and empirical literature dealing with trade1 . One topic which 
has attracted many writers is the impact of liberalization on the domestic 
economy. Foci vary: some analysts stress the welfare gains from trade, 
some the changes in demand for factors, some the regional impact; but a 
common thread exists in that most authors use a simple partial-equilibrium *
^A comprehensive summary of fairly recent work in trade analysis, 
stressing empirical applications of trade theory and relating different 
areas of analysis one to the other, is Robert Stern's survey article.
Ellen Homig is a graduate student in the Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Cornell University.
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model as a starting point for evaluating the costs and benefits of liber­
alization^. This model may then be extended in various ways to improve 
estimates of distributional effects and to take into account the presence 
of market 'distortions’ which affect measurement of the gains from trade.
As applications of the model proliferate, the need to re-examine 
both the model and the uses to which it is put becomes increasingly 
apparent. There are potentials in the model that remain unexploited; 
at the same time, the model is often ascribed more significance than it 
possesses, and policy conclusions are drawn from it with insufficient 
recognition of its inherently conservative nature.
This paper has three main goals. The first is to review and criti­
cize methods and applications of partial—equilibrium analysis actually 
used to study the impact of trade liberalization on various groups’ 
incomes, on regions, and on changes in demand for labor and capital. The 
second is to suggest how improvements, both theoretical and methodologicals 
may be made within the conventionally used framework. The third is to 
question whether this model, with its strong orientation towards the 
measurement of the efficiency gains from trade, is in fact a useful tool 
with which to evaluate distributional gains.
With respect to the second goal, two things are done. First, an 
improvement on the treatment of income distribution under liberalization 
in the partial-equilibrium model is outlined: by assuming that liberaliza­
tion is gradual rather than instantaneous, it is shown that the conven­
tional model, assuming instantaneous liberalization, overlooks a large 
flow of revenue or quota—rent income which may accrue over the course of 
staged liberalization. The political importance of this flow, and of other 
flows of income under staged liberalization, is also noted. Second, as 
part of criticizing extant measurements of adjustment costs, ways of 
improving the accuracy of these measurements are emphasized. 2
2An alternative to the static partial-equilibrium model used in 
trade impact analysis is the simulation model, which has recently been 
used in several trade impact studies (Rausser and Freebairn, Novakovic 
and Thompson, Jondrow et. al.). When properly designed and implemented, 
such a model can yield paths over time for all the transfers identifiable 
in the static model; moreover, it can trace the path between short-run 
shifts and final long-run import-induced changes, capturing both initial 
shocks and final ’equilibrium’ values. In this it has a great advantage 
over static models, particularly in facilitating estimation of the path 
of factor displacement and associated adjustment costs. Jondrow et. al. 
use this capacity in their study of the domestic impact of liberalized 
steel imports.
Because they are highly sector—specific and very complex, however, 
simulation models cannot be described and criticized in general terms 
as can static welfare models. For this reason they are not discussed here 
as models, although Jondrow et. al.’s study is used frequently to provide 
examples of sophisticated analysis of displacement and adjustment costs.
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The final goal is undertaken in the summary where, on the basis of 
what has been reviewed and contributed before, the potentialities and 
limitations of the partial-equilibrium analysis of trade impact are 
assessed. Limitations are seen to arise from two sources. First, 
because of the model's simple and highly aggregated nature, little 
information about actual changes in group incomes, or about other dis­
tributional effects, can be derived from the model. When distributional 
data are derived from the model, they are obtained by allocating 
aggregate changes to recipient groups on the basis of assumed patterns 
of distribution. Second, the role of weights applied, implicitly or 
explicitly, to costs and benefits estimated by the model is examined.
The question is raised whether by abandoning the conventional use of 
equal welfare weights this model can be made to contribute more to policy 
evaluation; it is then suggested that there may be more direct ways to 
approach this goal.
II. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
CHANGES IN OUTPUT, INCOMES, AND ’WELFARE1
Static Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Liberalization; the General Problem
Partial-equilibrium analysis of liberalization begins with the 
specification of domestic and foreign supply and demand conditions. 
Solutions under autarky and free trade are described, and the impact 
of liberalization is depicted as a movement towards the free-trade 
solution. After changes in domestic output are determined, concomitant 
changes in income levels and distribution, factor demand, and adjustment 
costs, may be studied. The type and degree of detail of distributional 
calculations will depend on the focus of the study and the availability of 
data.
In partial-equilibrium analysis it is conventional to assume that 
changes in the industry under study cause no significant repercussions 
elsewhere in the economy, Dardis and Learn detail the (presumably non­
existent) secondary effects of trade liberalization as "...changes in 
total employment, changes in the terms of trade and balance of payments, 
and changes in the prices of commodities in other parts of the economy
(Dardis and Learn, p. 23). Since many studies of liberalization do, in
fact, include estimations of interindustry effects and factor displacements, 
it is worth examining more closely the reasons for departing from the con­
ventional assumptions.
The primary reason for this departure is that, in various ways, the 
producers, factors, and markets involved do not conform closely to the 
perfectly competitive model. When firms are large, labor is organized, 
production is concentrated in a few communities or a single region, factors 
are not homogeneous, or the affected industry is linked heavily with other 
sectors, secondary effects gain importance. The way in which they are 
expressed depends on the nature of rigidities in the system.
To say that no price changes occur elsewhere in the economy as a
consequence of changes in output in a single industry is to say, in the
neoclassical framework, that no interindustry effects occur: no supply
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or demand pressures on product or factor markets are created outside of 
the affected industry. This situation might obtain if the industry were 
small. In practices however, the absence of price effects in factor or 
product markets may be due to price rigidities, in which case all 
adjustments must take place through quantity shifts. Changes in output 
and employment are then greater than they would be in the presence of 
flexible prices, and the assumption that total employment (or total factor 
demand) is unchanged may be invalid.
Given that institutional factors suggest that secondary effects will 
be significant, the research must establish the form that these effects 
will take. Partial-equilibrium studies of liberalized trade in manufactured 
goods generally assume wage and price rigidity and measure all effects 
as displacements (see, e .g . , Baldwin and Lewis; Baldwin, Mutti, and 
Richardson; Frank and Freeman; Isard; Magee; Mutti; Salant and Vaccara; 
and Szenberg, Lombardi, and Lee). Wage rigidities arise when wages are 
fixed over a period of time by negotiated contracts; price rigidities 
arise as delivery contracts, costs of reprinting catalogues, etc. decrease 
the frequency of price adjustments. The problem must be dealt with dif­
ferently when agricultural trade is involved: output prices here are 
generally assumed to be flexible (because product markets behave competi­
tively) , and factor adjustments, when they are considered, may be manifested 
in either form. When the major inputs are the proprietor’s labor, his 
privately owned land, and other fixed capital assets, adjustment takes 
place as a decrease in the implicit returns to these factors in fixed 
supply (see, e.g., Jackson), When factor services are purchased (e.g. when 
hired labor is heavily used)., adjustment is likely to be reflected at least 
in part in the form of layoffs or firings (see Harbert and Blandford, and 
Johnson, on the issue of liberalizing US sugar imports). These differing 
assumptions about the mechanisms by which secondary effects occur are 
reflected in the choice of the partial-equilibrium model used.
The assumption that no changes in the terms of trade (i.e. in the 
world price of the traded good) follow liberalization extends to the inter­
national sphere the assumption that demand changes exert insignificant 
pressures on supplying markets. This is the ’small country’ assumption 
favored by trade analysts because it implies that foreign supply is per­
fectly elastic at the world price. Under this circumstance, welfare gains 
and income changes are more easily estimated, and the task of estimating 
a foreign supply function is avoided^. Although this ’small country1 
assumption is almost always employed in partial-equilibrium analyses of 
liberalization, even for the US, there is evidence that foreign supply
It is not difficult to employ a less-than-perfectly elastic foreign 
supply curve, particularly in a linear model: Dardis and Learn show how 
this is done in discussing calculation of the costs of protection (gains 
from trade) (pp. 35-37).
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is generally price-elastic^, as one might expect it to be beyond the 
short run.
Finally, the assumption that the balance of payments is unaffected 
by liberalization is reasonable for most individual commodities but 
probably unreasonable for a few (e.g. oil). Balance-of-payments consider­
ations would be more important in a general-equilibrium study.
The important assumptions, then, are those that deal with domestic 
repercussions in product and factor markets, for it is the violation of 
these assumptions that gives impetus to the estimation of factor dis­
placement , regional impact, and adjustment costs. These estimations 
depend, however, on prior estimation of output displacement in the 
liberalized industry, which may be achieved with the static partial-equil­
ibrium model. The same model yields changes in incomes accruing to various 
groups, and the welfare gains from liberalization accruing to society as 
a whole; the derivation and interpretation of these measures is covered 
below.
Static Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Liberalization: Two Common Cases^
Two cases appear frequently in empirical analyses of trade liberaliza 
tion. In the first, domestic supply is less than infinitely elastic, 
foreign supply is perfectly elastic at the world price, and imports are 
perfect substitutes for domestic goods. In the second, both domestic 
and foreign supply are perfectly elastic (but at different prices), and 
imports are imperfect substitutes for domestic goods. Baldwin and Lewis 
suggest (p. 243) that
...(t)he most appropriate approach would seem to be to employ 
a perfect substitution model for agricultural and mineral pro­
ducts that introduces less—than-completely elastic supply 
curves and an imperfect substitution model with infinitely 
elastic supply curves for manufactured products,
but in practice completely elastic foreign supply is commonly assumed 
for agricultural imports as well. This can usually be justified when the 
tariff or quota change under examination is absolutely small (note^that 
a 30 percent tariff reduction is still absolutely small if the tariff is 
originally set at 6 percent ad valorem). The two models described above 
are depicted in figures 1 and 2. *1
^Baldwin and Lewis cite as evidence Clark's finding that ...a
1 percent change in U.S. demand for finished manufactures caused foreign 
producers to change their price by 0.32 percent” (Baldwin and Lewis, 
p. 243, fn. 5). Clark's work is reported in Peter Clark, "The Effects 
of Recent Exchange Rate Changes on U.S. Trade Balance," in P. Clark,
D. Logue and R. Sweeney, eds., The Effects^of Exchange Rate Adjustments 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).
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Formal equivalency between tariffs and quotas is assumed to obtain, so 
that a quota may be translated into a tariff-equivalent^, and liberaliza­
tion is represented as a move to complete free trade.
These models, particularly the perfect-substitution one (figure 1), 
are well known, but it may be useful to review the interpretation of the 
areas under the curves and recall once more the problems inherent in 
comparing them.
In figure 1, the instantaneous move from protection to free trade 
causes the domestic price to fall from Pn to the world level, P.. Domestic
^ d. d ^consumption of the traded good rises from to ; domestic production
falls from to Q® . Imports increase from (Q^ - Qq ) to (Q^ - Q^)• These
shifts cause an increase in consumer surplus of (A + B + C + D) , a fall 
in producer surplus of Ab , and a fall in government tariff revenues, or 
quota-holders' rents, of C (to zero). The areas B and D represent welfare 
gains to society. B, the welfare gain in production (or domestic resource 
cost of protection), measures the amount by which the costs of producing 
the protected good exceed the opportunity costs of employing the factors 
thus used elsewhere, given world prices. D measures that increase in 
consumer surplus not offset by losses elsewhere in the economy.
Figure 2a depicts the import-consuming sector in the importing 
country. Liberalization causes the domestic price of the imported good 
to fall from Pq to the world level, P^, and domestic consumption to rise
from to » Consumer surplus increases by (M + W), while tariff revenues
or quota rents are decreased by M. Increased consumption of the imported
5That is, an ad valorem tariff of (P -P1)/P1 *100 percent will^ave the 
same effect on prices and quantities as will a quota measured by (Q^~Qq ) 
(figures 1, 2a) (see Bhagwati), This equivalence breaks down when one or 
more actors behave as monopolists or monopsonists (see Bhagwati; Shibata; 
McCulloch).
6The concepts of consumer surplus and producer surplus are discussed 
at length in Currie, Murphy and Schmitz (especially in pp. 742-758). Con­
sumer surplus, as measured here, corresponds to Hicksian compensating 
variation if^  it can plausibly be assumed that the ordinary demand curve 
coincides with the compensated demand curve: i.e„, that the income effect 
of a price change is zero. This assumption is tolerable for most single 
commodities, but questionable in the case of trade in large bundles of 
goods.
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FIGURE I. PERFECT-SUBSTITUTION MODEL
^The interpretation of producer surplus in the context of trade 
policy analysis is often clouded by uncertainty over the nature of the 
supply curve. The meaning of the surplus area varies according to 
whether the supply curve is a short-run curve, with factor prices 
fixed but factor supplies perfectly elastic; a long-run curve with 
some factor (e.g. land) still in fixed supply; a long-run curve with 
all factors in perfectly or imperfectly elastic supply; or something 
in between (see Currie, Murphy and Schmitz, pp. 753-758). Further­
more, if over the course of gradual liberalization industry supply 
curves change because, for instance, factor supplies are altered as 
expected factor returns decrease, measurement and interpretation will 
be complicated.
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FIGURE 2 a. IMPERFECT-SUBSTITUTION MODEL: 
IMPORT SECTOR
FIGURE 2b. IMPERFECT-SUBSTITUTION MODEL: 
DOMESTIC IMPORT-COMPETING 
SECTOR
good causes demand for the domestic good to fall, as represented by the 
leftward shift of the demand curve, in figure 2b, from DD to D ’D*.
Domestic output falls from to . With perfectly elastic domestic
supply, there is no change in producer surplus.
In evaluating the effect of liberalization with one of these models, 
it is conventionally assumed that the marginal utility of income is the 
same for each group involved, and that intergroup comparisons of utility 
can be made. This convenient assumption permits most of the income changes 
measured in the model to be 'netted out': the gain in consumer surplus is 
partly balanced by losses in revenue or rent, and producer surplus, 
leaving a net gain of (B + D) in figure 1, or N in figure 2a. For this 
reason areas A and C in figure 1, and M in figure 2a are often referred 
to as 1 transfer1 areas: one group's loss becomes another's gain. Impli­
cit in this approach is the assumption that redistributional considera­
tions are extraneous to the evaluation of the desirability of a given 
policy: if gainers could compensate losers and still be better off, the 
policy change is preferred to the current state.
The empirical literature on trade liberalization frequently stresses 
welfare gains and overlooks implicit transfers (e.g. Magee; Bale and 
Greenshields; Szenberg _et_, aM.) Yet, empirically, estimated transfer 
areas tend to be far larger than the welfare gain triangles. In Magee's 
study, under varying assumptions^, net welfare gains from liberalization 
equal between 2.3 and 7.2 percent of the 'pure* transfer area (A + C) 
in the perfect substitution model, and up to 13 percent of the comparable 
area (M) in the imperfect-substitution model. Comparable magnitudes are 
reported in other studies. Bale reports that calculated transfer costs 
involved in the protection of Japanese agricultural trade and production 
are "...often more than ten times the size of the net social losses..."
(p. 349). Mintz finds that the welfare loss incurred by maintaining US 
sugar quotas equals between 18 and 24 percent of the pure transfer area8 , 
and this appears to be the highest estimate in the literature.
Taken together, the relatively large sizes of the transfer areas, 
and the not-altogether defensible practice of effecting comparisons 
between changes in different groups' welfares by equating utility with 
income and assuming that the marginal unit of income is of equal value 
to all groups, suggest that closer attention should be paid to distri­
butional changes measured by the model and less to efficiency gains.
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^Magee estimates these areas separately for the short and long run, 
using more elastic demand curves in the short run (hence the greater size 
of the long-run gain). Percentages are calculated from Magee’s data on 
pp. 663 and 667.
8Calculated from Mintz's data, p. 40. Mintz uses a perfect-substi­
tution model, but makes two assumptions about the differential between 
world and domestic prices under free trade - hence the two estimates of 
welfare costs.
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However, obstacles arise to measuring the real distributional effects 
of liberalization which are not always easily overcome. First, the 
groups or individuals who bear the benefits and costs of the fall in the 
price of the traded good are not necessarixy easy to identify. Second, 
estimated domestic output displacement, upon which all subsequent esti­
mates of factor displacement and adjustment costs depend, can be very 
sensitive to the model chosen and the output displacement mechanism 
assumed.
Distribution of surplus
As is shown above, liberalization causes a decrease in producer 
surplus and tariff revenues or quota rents, and an increase in consumer 
surplus. From the point of view of the economist who focuses on net 
welfare gains, the distribution of the surplus is uninteresting; but from 
the point of view of the recipients, and of the politicians they elect, 
the distribution of losses and gains is of paramount importance.
The consumer surplus, or 'user surplus1, as Mintz more accurately 
terms it, accrues in theory to the consumer of the imported good. However 
there are two ways in which this assertion is frequently misunderstood. 
First, when the imported good is an intermediate good, the first user is 
a producer. To the extent that decreased costs are passed on, through 
lower prices, some portion of the surplus will accrue to the politically^ 
defined fconsumer?— but this portion will be determined by market power 
and pricing practices within industries, and may not be identifiable.
Some authors tend to equate gains or losses of surplus, as measured by 
the model, with welfare gains or losses for real social groups (e.g. Bale) 
This practice could be particularly misleading in a multi-industry study, 
such as Magee's, where a large portion of the consumer surplus may accrue 
to producers.
Second, when the imported good is actually a final demand good, 
the question arises of how benefits from liberalization are distributed 
among different income classes of consumers. Bale and Mintz both dis­
cuss, in a general way, the regressive impact on low-income consumers 
of restrictions applied to trade in necessities (food and apparel).
Bale (p. 348) states that
...the costs to consumers are unevenly borne. Consumers in 
the lower income brackets bear a disproportionate burden in 
that a larger portion of their income is spent on food than 
is the case with wealthier consumers. Thus, the effect of 
price intervention is not only to transfer Income from 
consumers to producers, but also to skew income distribution 
categories. 9
9I have not found any studies which try empirically to trace the 
distribution of surplus in this manner.
Mintz notes that textile quotas not only share the general regressivity 
of consumption taxes, but by virtue of their particular structure^® dis­
proportionately restrict cheaper types of imports, doubly penalizing lower 
income groups (p. 65).
Studies of the welfare or distributional impact of liberalization 
do not seem to attach much importance to this question, since nowhere 
among these studies does one find estimates of the distribution of sur­
plus among consumers.H The question is approached from a different 
angle by Fieleke, who attempts to measure the distributional impact on 
consumers of the US tariff structure. He does this by estimating the 
percentage of total consumption expenditures paid to tariffs by consumers 
in each of three income classes. Since he omits both indirectly borne 
tariff costs, and costs imposed by other forms of trade restriction, 
his estimates may be too low. He finds the overall impact of the tariffs 
to be mildly regressive: tariff expenditures in 1967 absorbed 2.1 percent 
of the lower budget group’s expenditures, 1.8 percent of the moderate 
budget group’s., arid 1.7 percent of the higher budget group’s (p. 646). 
Presumably, abandoning the tariffs would then cause benefits to be dis­
tributed in a mildly progressive manner.
Fieleke’s low figures may explain why estimation of distribution 
impact on consumers generally attracts little interest. The distributional 
impact on consumers of a price change in any one commodity, or even a group 
of traded commodities, will be miniscule unless the item plays a major 
role, directly and indirectly, in consumption (e.g. textiles, apparel, 
oil), and the price change is absolutely large. In most cases it is 
probably more fruitful to study the division of surplus between inter­
mediate and final users than to concentrate on inter-consumer distribution.
Analogous problems arise in determining the real distribution of 
the loss of producer surplus associated with liberalization. As with 
consumer surplus, there is a dual problem of discovering first who the 
affected producers are, and then of identifying (by studying the structures 
of ownership, market power, and such) the intra-firm allocation of the loss. 
The first question is addressed in the literature; the second appears not 
to be. Mintz attempts to divide the increase in producer surplus caused
Since quotas limit quantities, not values, of imports, exporters 
are induced to concentrate on more expensive lines of goods. Fewer of 
the lower priced goods, which would be bought by the poorer consumer, 
are supplied (Mintz, p » 65).
"^Outside of the literature on liberalization, there are studies 
of the impact of government policies on various groups of consumers. See, 
e.g. Josling’s estimates of the costs per household (grouped by income 
class and family composition) of a shift in farm price-support policy in 
Great Britain.
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by raw sugar quotas into extra profits accruing to domestic low-cost 
producers (those who would be in business even without protection) and 
profits to producers of quota-induced additional output (p. 43).
This much is easily d o n e ^ , but one cannot tell from the model whether 
the protection-induced profits accrue to the same producers as do extra 
profits (as income on increased output) or whether they go to older, 
higher-cost plants which remain in use because of protection. The 
distinction is important, particularly where patterns of geographic 
dispersion of production correspond to an identifiable cost structure.
This appears to be the case, for instance, in the U.S. steel industry 
(Jondrow et. al., ch. 7) and in U.S. sugar beet and cane production 
(Harbert and Blandford; Johnson).
Intra-firm or intra—sectoral distribution of the producer surplus 
lost to liberalization is generally ignored. An interesting alterna­
tive, though, is offered by Harbert and Blandford, who study the poten­
tial’ costs and benefits of liberalizing U.S. sugar imports. In addition 
to measuring, by conventional means, the loss of producer surplus 
associated with elimination of the tariff on sugar imports in 1977, they 
estimate directly various costs accruing at the farm level. These are 
changes in returns per acre to sugar growers (with and without replace­
ment of sugar with the best alternative crop) and changes in returns to 
farm labor (also with and without alternative crops). Machinery costs 
are included in per acre losses, under the assumption that displaced 
specialized equipment has no alternative use and a "negligible resale 
value" (pp. 10-15). These costs are not identical to the change in pro­
ducer surplus; they are estimated with short-run supply assumptions, 
whereas the supply curves used to calculate surplus are closer to long- 
run ones. Furthermore, the overlap between these costs and the costs 
included in producer surplus is in many ways imperfect. The problem of 
breaking down producer surplus into its separate components is thus 
not directly addressed. In general, to allocate producer surplus between 
various factors and profits one needs a lot of accounting information, 
something which is probably more easily secured for agricultural producers 
than for manufacturers.
The problem of identifying the impact on producers of liberalization 
is complicated in the simple imperfect—substitution model where, with 
perfectly elastic domestic supply, producer surplus does not even exist 
(figure 2b). If costs are truly constant, one could estimate the change 
in producer profits by assuming some average markup over costs and 
multiplying this by the output foregone. If the industry is oligopolistic, 
identifying producer losses will be extremely difficult• Changes in 
producer surplus can more easily be measured if domestic supply is less 
than perfectly elastic (figure 3):
"^Actually, it can only be done if the domestic supply curve is 
upward-sloping. Referring to figure 1, the portion of the producer 
surplus to the left of Q| accrues, under protection, to efficient pro­
ducers; the remainder accrues to inefficient producers who need protec­
tion to stay in business.
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FIGURE 3. PRODUCER AND CONSUMER SURPLUS IN 
THE DOMESTIC SECTOR ; IMPERFECT- 
SUBSTITUTION MODEL WITH LESS-THAN 
PERFECTLY ELASTIC DOMESTIC SUPPLY
in this case, the liberalization-induced demand shift causes the price 
of the domestic good to fall. The loss of producer surplus, shown as a 
shaded area, is equivalent to the increase in consumer surplus; no 
net welfare gains accrue (Jondrow et. al. p. 6—7).
The absence' of attention paid to the real distribution of producer 
surplus is unfortunate. Such information would not only be interesting 
in itself; it would also indicate the stakes that different groups 
involved in production might have in opposing liberalization. The 
income losses thus entailed create powerful incentives for producers 
and organized labor to lobby against liberalization, which frequently 
they do, and at times with great success. Thus it is important to iden­
tify as accurately as possible the losses to different groups implied 
by liberalization, in order to anticipate source and strengths of 
opposition, and to facilitate adjustment (e.g. through adjustment 
assistance).
The third 'transfer1 area in the partial-equilibrium model of liber­
alization measures either tariff revenues or quota rents. When protection 
has been effected through tariffs, a movement to free trade causes the
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government to lose these revenues. Perhaps because the government is 
not thought to have interests independent of its clients’, the loss 
of these revenues is generally ignored in the literature. This is 
probably justifiable in single-commodity studies; in multi-commodity 
cases, though, revenue losses become quite large, and the question of 
whether they are offset by revenues gained through increased trade 
arises. Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson address this question and find 
that a 50 percent multilateral tariff reduction yields net revenue 
gains (pp. 8-10, 21). If revenues lost through liberalization of trade 
in one good were not offset by increased revenue from concomitant 
increases in other imports, they would have to be offset, explicitly 
or implicitly, through the domestic economy.
Accrual of quota rents is a more complicated topic, as the structure 
of the quota system determines who captures the rents. Mintz writes 
(p. 30) that
..(w)hether this extra income, the quota profit, goes to the 
exporter or to the importer, or is shared by both, depends 
on the method of distributing the quota. If the government 
sells licenses entitling the holder to import the good, the 
price differential becomes government revenue. If the 
government merely imposes a global quota or if it licenses 
domestic importers so that they have an interest in shopping 
around the world for the lowest priced good, the entire 
differential, or quota profit, may go to the importers.
Under such circumstances the import cost is a transfer 
cost and not part of the national cost of the quota. But 
if the importing country allocates the quota by country of 
origin and leaves the allocation by business firms to the 
exporting industries, then these industries will act as 
cartels and the entire quota profit will be theirs.
In practice, quota and quota- like systems are generally structured so as 
to channel some portion of rents to supplier countries. Both the former 
U.S. sugar import quota system, and the U.S. dairy import quota^system,  ^
allot individual quotas to exporting countries. The system of voluntary 
export restraints, or VERs, used to limit imports into the U.S. of 
apparel and textiles, is similarly structured. When quota rents are  ^
thus transferred abroad, sizable benefits accrue to exporting countries ; 
when benefits are potentially large, their distribution may play a role
■^■^ An illustration! a recent article on Japanese imports of oranges 
estimated that quota-holders1 profits amounted to around $43.9 million, 
with this sum being divided among 91 firms and individuals having exclu­
sive rights to import (the profits thus accrued to the Japanese). It 
was also reported that 22 of the quota-holders collectively controlled 
over 60 percent of orange imports. Profits for this group would thus 
average approximately $1.2 million per quota holder (Wall Street Journal, 
Nov. 1, 1978).
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in an importing country’s foreign policy. The U.S. sugar quota program 
is generally acknowledged to have been used in this manner (Johnson). 
Stern notes that, as a rule, "..quota arrangements are subject to much 
abuse," and terms them "..a pernicious form of trade control.."
(pp. 868-869). They are nevertheless an increasingly popular one, 
despite the fact that the GATT attempts to place strict limitations on 
their use.^
In summary, then, the actual distribution of income changes under 
liberalization is not adequately represented by the transfer areas in 
the partial-equilibrium model. If one were to analyze the real distri­
bution of surplus between interested groups, a more accurate picture 
of the distributional impact of liberalization would emerge.
Output displacement
Although real changes in income are one of the significant effects 
of trade liberalization, empirical analyses of distributional impact 
focus strongly on the issue of factor (primarily labor) displacement 
and the costs thereof. Identification of these depends on prior 
estimation of output displacement (changes in domestic output) , which 
is achieved through the partial-equilibrium model. The process is 
straightforward in the perfect-substitution model, but more complicated 
in the imperfect-substitution model.
The perfect-substitution model (figure 1) is conventionally assumed 
to be an excess-demand model, demand for imports being determined as 14*
14Article XI of the GATT states that
...(n)o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, 
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the terri­
tory of any other contracting party or on the exporta­
tion or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party.
The same article lists numerous exceptions to the preceding, including 
one which permits restriction of agricultural or fisheries products when 
necessary to enforce domestic governmental measures which restrict 
domestic production of competing goods or remove temporary surpluses 
of the same from the market (art. XI (2) (c)). The well-known "escape 
clause1 is detailed in article XIX. The U.S. dairy import quota does 
not conform to the GATT requirements for restriction of agricultural 
imports (domestic production is not restrained, as it was in the domes­
tic sugar program); in 1954 the U.S. sought and obtained a waiver 
of its GATT commitments to permit continuation of Section 22 quotas.
The information summarized here appears in the U.S. Tariff Commission,
TC Publication 243.
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a residual after domestic supply has been absorbed . The price is 
determined exogenously by the world price under free trade, or by the 
world price plus a tariff or tariff-equivalent under protection. When_ 
the price falls, the decrease in domestic import-competing production is 
measured directly by (Qg - QJ)- If the supply curve is a long-run one,
as it is conventionally assumed to be when displacements are measured 
(Magee), the change in output is implicitly ’assigned' to higher-cost 
producers16 17. Knowledge of the cost structure of the industry (either 
in terms of geographic distribution of different-cost plants, or of 
factor/output ratios associated with different cost levels^ can then 
be employed to improve estimates of distributional impact .
By contrast, the imperfect-substitution model does not yield a 
direct estimate of output displacement, nor does it allocate changes 
in output among different-cost producers when the domestic supply 
elasticity is infinite. Displacement in the domestic sector is deter­
mined in theory by the elasticity of demand for domestic good!? with 
respect to the import price. The distribution of the change in output 
among domestic producers can be determined when domestic supply is less 
than perfectly elastic, but is difficult to identify when the elasticity 
is infinite.
Output displacement follows liberalization in an indirect manner.
As the price of the import good falls, the relative price of the domestic 
good rises. When demand for the domestic good is portrayed^as a^function 
solely of the domestic price (figure 2b), the demand curve is shifted 
leftward by this price change, and domestic output falls by (Qq - Qf)■
Cross-price elasticities are apparently not always obtainable, either 
because attempts to estimate them fail (e.g. Szenberg^et. al.,^PP. 6^2-82) 
or because too many industries are involved for individual estimations 
to be feasible (Baldwin and Lewis, p. 243). Mutti does succeed in^ 
estimating these for the five industries in his study (p. 106). Given 
the empirical difficulties involved, many authors simply estimate (or 
borrow) elasticities of import demand, calculate the increased value of 
imports following liberalization, and assume dollar-for-dollar displacement
15
16If foreign and domestic goods are truly perfect substitutes, this 
is hard to defend. However, it is reasonable to suppose that domestic 
purchasers will prefer to buy from domestic producers; information about 
products is more easily obtained, business transactions may be made more 
quickly, language barriers do not exist, and so forth.
"^Each point on the supply curve corresponds, in theory, to the 
minimum average cost of producing the corresponding amount of the good.
17Vintage-capital models, discussed further on in this paper, relate 
factor displacement directly to cost structure (Isard; Jondrow £t. al.)
In chapter 7 of Jondrow et. al., cost structure is related to geographic 
distribution via age of plant.
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of domestic output, suitable adj ustmeijL^  being made to bring import 
values into line with producer prices (e.g. Baldwin and Lewis;
Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson; Szenberg, Lombardi and Lee). Mutti 
uses his estimated cross-price elasticities to calculate displacement 
(p. 106); it would be interesting as well to compare his results with 
those obtained using dollar-for-dollar displacement.
Whichever displacement mechanism is used, the problem of relating 
the distribution of displacement to industry cost structure remains.
If the perfectly elastic supply function really describes the long-run 
response of the firms involved-^, changes in output must be allocated 
proportionally among producers, for lack of information suggesting any 
other pattern. Even if the infinitely elastic supply curve arises as 
a consequence of oligopolistic behavior (with a few price leaders^ 
setting prices high enough to shelter some other less efficient firms), 
the absence of a domestic price shift makes it impossible to demonstrate 
that displacement should be other than proportional. A priori assumption 
of perfectly elastic domestic supply forces all subsequent displacements 
to be distributed proportionally over firms; if the assumption is not 
carefully justified, the distributional impacts consequent upon it may 
be suspect.
This concludes discussion of the implicit income-distributional 
effects and the impact on domestic production measured by static partial- 
equilibrium analysis. This model is widely used in the analysis of the 
impact of liberalization, yet it is deficient in one major respect: 
it relies on instantaneous liberalization, whereas in practice trade 2Q 
liberalizations of significant magnitudes are usually taken in stages
"^Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson describe the price adjustment in a 
two-way model of liberalization as follows: "...the appropriate inter
national margins (are first subtracted) from exports to obtain exports 
on an f.p.b. basis, and then... domestic trade and transportation margins 
(are deducted) from both f.o.b. exports and c.i.f. imports to^obtain 
final demand changes in each sector on a producer-value basis (p. 17, 
fn. 15).
"^Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, as well as Mutti, rely on a paper 
by Walters (A. Walters, "Production and Cost Eunctions: An Econometric
Survey," Econometrica 31 (January 1963): 1-66) for justification of^the 
infinitely elastic domestic supply function in manufacturing. Mutti 
estimates domestic supply functions for five manufacturing industries and 
reports that "..estimates yield confidence intervals that include large 
positive and negative numbers, and consequently they are assumed to be 
infinite.." (p. 105).
20Tariff cuts agreed upon in the recently completed Tokyo Round of 
MTNs will be staged over 8 years.
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Because staged liberalization creates a flow of costs and benefits to 
affected groups, and stretches out the period of adjustment to changed 
output, its distributional impact can differ appreciably from that of 
instantaneous liberalization. Before turning to methods of estimating 
factor displacement and adjustment costs, topics central to the evalua­
tion of the distributional impact of liberalization, staged liberaliza­
tion is discussed in the context of the partial-equilibrium model.
Staged Liberalization: Analysis with a Partial-Equilibrium Model
There are two ways in which dynamic elements may be introduced into 
the static partial-equilibrium model. The first, which is done in conjunc­
tion with extending the measurement of welfare gains over time, is to 
permit demand and/or supply curves to shift exogenously over time, in 
order to reflect population or industrial growth^, The second is to let 
liberalization occur in stages and to study the time paths of changes in 
surplus, revenue or rent, and output, Mutti considers the paths of wel­
fare gains and adjustment costs under staged liberalization, but 
apparently no-one else has studied the other aspects of liberalization 
in quite this fashion. I therefore take this opportunity to outline a 
simple model of the behavior of implicit transfers when liberalization 
is staged over a period of several years.
Staged liberalization causes both relative and absolute 'transfers' 
to differ from those measured in the instantaneous-liberalization model, 
due to the combined effects of discounting and the different directions 
of change taken by consumer surplus, producer surplus,and rents or revenues 
over time. Consumer gains and producer losses (as formally defined in 
the model) are both reduced by staged liberalization; rents or revenues, 
which fall to zero under instantaneous free trade, behave quite peculiarly 
with more gradual change. If the initial level of protection is suffi­
ciently high, rents may first increase, reach a maximum, and then gradually 
fall as liberalization progresses. Assuming that the three transfer areas 
identified in the model correspond to benefits or losses accruing to 
identifiable groups, gradual liberalization may be shown to have significant
For example, Magee assumes that domestic supply and demand grow 
at the same rate, which is constant over time (p„ 684). Szenberg, et. al. 
assume only that import demand grows at a constant rate, proportionate 
to the increase in domestic disposable incomes, despite the fact that 
the growth rate in recent years has been very much higher; they assume 
that as the market share of imports increases their growth rate will come 
down to the assumed 4 percent level (pp. 85-86). Mutti also assumes 
that imports will 'settle down' from their observed high growth rates 
and "converge to the current growth rate of the combined market for 
import and domestic competing goods" (p. 105). Note that when only wel­
fare gains (not transfers) are considered, domestic supply shifts are 
irrelevant in the imperfect-substitution model; all welfare gains arise 
in the import-demand sector (see figure 2).
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political advantages, which reinforce the social value some feel to be 
inherent in gradual, as opposed to abrupt, change.
The importance of the rate of liberalization in determining the 
behavior of income changes is illustrated below with a simple, linear 
perfect-substitution model (figure 4). Let all supply and demand curves 
be fixed over the period of liberalization (though this is not necessary) .
The initial tariff or quota fixes the price at P - P^ ; liberalization
is staged so that the price falls in equal decrements from PQ to the world 
price, Pw .
It is apparent that producer and consumer surpluses, discounted to 
their present values, will be less than when liberalization is instantaneous. 
As the price falls, producers take the largest losses in the first period 
and smaller losses in subsequent ones. Consumers gain less in the earlier 
stages than in later ones, so that under gradual liberalization the present 
value of consumer surplus shrinks, relative to its value under instantaneous 
liberalization, more than do producer losses.
The strength of this effect depends, in the linear model, on the 
slopes of the supply and demand curves. For the producer, the steeper 
the supply curve, the more valuable is delayed liberalization: propor­
tionately more of the total loss is deferred to the future. Conversely, 
the less steep the supply function, the larger the portion of the total 
loss taken at the outset. Producers must therefore always favor staged 
liberalization, but should be particularly supportive of it (given its 
inevitability) when supply is not price-responsive. This suggests that 
agricultural producers will, as a rule, be more interested in gradual 
liberalization than will producers of manufactured goods.
D S
FIGURE 4. STAGED LIBERALIZATION IN THE PERFEGT- 
SUBSTI TUT ION MODEL
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Just as producers lose less with staged liberalization, consumers 
gain less. When the demand curve is steep, a smaller portion of the surplus 
is deferred to the future than is the case when the curve is shallow; 
thus, ceteris paribus, the consumer should he less opposed to staged liber­
alization of imports of basic necessities than to the same treatment 
afforded luxury goods (if one is speaking generally of final demand goods).
But is this reasonable? The problem here is that consumer response must 
be considered with reference to the whole bundle of import goods consumed.
The foregoing statement holds only if expenditures on the two sorts of 
goods are roughly equal.
Consumer and producer interests may be compared in the case of liber­
alization of a single good„ When both supply and demand curves are steep, 
the case for gradual liberalization, based solely on the behavior of 
producer and consumer surpluses, is strongest: producer losses are mini­
mized, as is the proportion of consumer surplus forfeited through deferral. 
Conversely, if neither curve is steep, neither consumers nor producers 
have a strong reason to favor phased liberalization, though producers 
must always prefer it to instantaneous liberalization, and consumers 
must always prefer the latter.
In any case, the picture of group preferences is incomplete without 
consideration of the behavior of rents or revenues under phased liberali­
zation. Under the assumption that the government is not interested in the 
behavior of revenues once it is committed to liberalization, the following 
discussion is confined to quota rents.
The behavior of rents in this model is particularly interesting because, 
depending on the initial price level (P ), rents may either increase,
decrease, or stay the same in the first stages of liberalization, in marked 
contrast to their fate under free trade. A corollary of this is that 
partial liberalization, which will have unambiguous impacts on both 
consumer and producer surpluses, may have any of three effects on quota 
rents.
The reason for this may be seen casually by inspecting figure 4, and 
formally by setting up a quota rent function and maximizing it with respect 
to the domestic price of the import good. Referring to figure 4, let 
the price fall by (P -P^) . When this happens, quota-holders lose rents
equivalent to C. At the same time they gain new rents, equivalent to (E + F) ,
as their imports expand from (Qq “ Qq ) to (Q^ - Q^) • As long as the
marginal rent increase exceeds the rents lost, quota holders' incomes will 
rise as the price falls.
By maximizing the quota rent function with respect to any price P , it
may be shown that rents are greatest when the domestic price is halfway be­
tween the price at autarky and the world price. Let quota rents at any 
price P be defined as
(1) R = (P - P ) [(Q? - Q!) + (Qt ~ Q^) 3 where Q® = Q* = domestic autarkic
equilibrium.
Using simple linear supply and demand functions of the form
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(2) = -  (a - Pt) (e.g. = a - bQt) ; b > 0
(3) Q® = i (P - c) (e.g. P® = c + eQt) ; e > 0
and substituting into (1):
(4) R -  (P -P )(P* -P )(i+i)
Taking the derivative with respect to P and rearranging terms yields
(5) dR/dP = (P., +  P -  2P ) A  +  h ,t w t b e
so that revenue is maximized when
(6) P - ™  (P, + P ) . t 2 * w
Rents decrease on either side of this price line, the rate of decrease 
depending on the slopes of the lines.
Two aspects of the behavior of quota rents merit attention, first, 
the position of the initial price relative to the rent-maximizing price 
will determine whether quota-holders' incomes can or cannot be increased 
by liberalization. If extant prices exceed the maximizing level, quota- 
holders should support partial liberalization which will bring the domestic 
price down to the rent-maximizing level. If complete liberalization is 
inevitable, quota-holders should seek a pattern of price adjustment that 
will move them rapidly to the optimal level and delay as long as possible 
movement beyond that point. If prices are already below the optimal level 
before liberalization begins, the present value of rent receipts is maxi­
mized by slowing the change as much as possible. This behavior of rents 
suggests that quota-holders' approaches to lobbying will be varied: if 
initial quotas are very small relative to total demand, quota-holders 
will probably side with consumers and lobby for partial (certainly not 
complete) liberalization; but if the quota is relatively large, quota- 
holders , like producers, will oppose liberalization, and advocate gradual 
change if change is unavoidable.
A second interesting property of quota-rent behavior is that pairs 
of quotas exist which, by yielding appropriate pairs of prices on either 
side of the rent-maximizing level, will yield identical rents with dif­
ferent levels of imports. These will correspond to identical profits if 
importing is a constant-cost industry^. Thus if the initial import level
^ I f  costs increase with volume, profits will fall even though rents 
are identical; if they decrease, as would be the case if initial import 
levels were very low and economies of scale remained to be exploited, 
profits will be greater after liberalization even though rents are unchanged. 
The role of cost structure in determining importers' profits is suggested 
by Corden1 s work (Corden, 1971, p. 202).
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is low and the price above the importer's optimal level, liberalization 
can, in theory, be achieved without disturbing rent receipts at all. In 
practice, calculating the relevant price levels may be difficult - and 
even if it is possible, price adjustments may not be instantaneous, so 
that rents will not really be unchanged (they may increase temporarily).
In summary, it is interesting to examine the behavior of 'transfers' 
under staged liberalization because in doing so different rationales for 
what is, politically, an accepted practice become clear. First, gradual 
rather than instantaneous liberalization tends to favor both producers 
and quota-holders over consumers, a result consistent with the widely held 
conviction that policy makers weight the welfare of producers more heavily 
than that of consumers23. Second, gradual liberalization avoids the 
creation of sudden income losses, and is thus consistent with optimizing 
behavior under Corden's 'conservative social welfare function'. Corden 
maintains that "...any significant absolute reductions in real incomes 
of any significant section of the community should be avoided" (Corden, 
1974, p. 107), citing the unfairness of deliberately lowering anyone's 
income, the benefits conferred on risk averters by ruling out large losses, 
and the advantage to the government of maintaining social peace by avoiding 
large transfers. Corden stresses the fact that his welfare function is 
designed to apply to the method of change rather than to preserve the 
status quo, and himself uses it to advocate gradual over sudden liberali- 
ization (pp. 107-109). In this framework one does not need a theory of 
clientele groups to justify slow or partial liberalization. Third, gradual 
liberalization probably minimizes factor displacements and the adjustment 
costs arising therefrom; a strong point in its favor and one that is dealt 
with insufficiently in the literature on the distributional impact of trade
This concludes discussion of the measurement of changes in output, 
income, and welfare in partial-equilibrium models of liberalization.
These changes, while of major importance, reflect only part of the total 
impact of liberalization. The factor displacements and consequent adjust­
ment costs which follow losses of output when market 'distortions' exist 
constitute another class of potential effects of liberalization. Measure­
ment of these effects is discussed in the following section.
For evidence, see Rausser and Freebairn on beef import quotas. The 
authors state (p. 446) that "...over the period 1959-1969 policy makers 
weighted a two-dollar increase in beef producer returns...as approximately 
equivalent in social value to a one-dollar decrease in consumer meat costs. 
Consumers here are 'consumers' in the popular sense - it is hard to say 
whether the assumption about favored clientele groups holds when consumers 
are industries for which the import is an intermediate good.
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III. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
FACTOR DISPLACEMENT AND ADJUSTMENT COSTS
An Overview of the Problem
Were the real world accurately depicted by the perfectly competitive 
model of economic behavior, and characterized by complete factor mobility, 
factor displacement would never persist. Factors released from production 
in one industry would immediately be absorbed into another, and no social 
adjustment costs would arise (private costs could still exist).
In fact, displacement can be a significant problem in the wake of 
trade-induced losses of production. Changes in output cause the derived^ 
demand for factors of production to change; rigid prices, and other insti­
tutional rigidities, impede the reabsorption of these factors; and costs, 
both private and social, are thereby incurred. Demand-induced displacements 
may be reduced somewhat by taking advantage of voluntary changes in factor 
supply (attrition), but empirical evidence repeatedly confirms that factor 
displacements attain significant levels when domestic output is sharply 
reduced.
Several steps are required to estimate the adjustment costs likely to 
accompany liberalization. First, the connection between decreased produc­
tion and decreased factor demand must be established. Second, changes in 
factor supply should be studied. Third, the probable duration of factor 
unemployment must be estimated. Lastly, values must be attached to these 
services foregone. Measurement may be further complicated by efforts to 
establish the geographic or demographic distribution of losses.
In the pages which follow, considerable attention is paid to exactly 
how estimates of displacement and costs are obtained, as well as to the 
theoretical considerations underlying the methods used. The intent is 
to provide, to some extent, a practical handbook as well as a discussion.
Factor Displacement: Changes in Demand
The demand for factors of production is a derived demand determined 
by the demand for output. When liberalization causes domestic production 
to fall, there are associated declines in demand for labor and capital. In 
a perfectly competitive system, at equilibrium, factor displacements could 
not persist, as relative prices would adjust instantaneously to permit^the 
reabsorption of these factors into production - but in the real world 
displacements can and do persist, resulting in significant private and socia 
costs and creating political problems.
The central question in the determination of the reduction in factor 
demand is: how are changes in the level and composition of factor demand 
related to changes in output? The crucial determinants of this relation­
ship are industrial cost structures, the nature of factor and output 
pricing, and the degree of substitutability between factors. Also of inter­
est in the study of displacement are such distributional questions^as the  ^
occupational characteristics of displaced workers and the geographic distri 
bution of changes in factor demand,
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The simplest displacement mechanisms are those used when an industry 
is assumed to be characterized by constant costs in both the short and^ 
long runs, rigid wages and prices, and no substitutability between capital 
and labor. When these conditions hold, factor displacements are propor­
tionate to output displacement: that is, demand for labor declines by the 
same percentage as does demand for output. Empirically, estimation of dis­
placement of any factor is achieved by multiplying the value of the change 
in output by the average factor/output ratio. This is done in the studies 
by Salant and Vaccara, Szenberg et. al., Mutti, Magee, Baldwin and Lewis, 
and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, all of which, excepting Magee, deal 
solely with liberalized trade in manufacturing industries.
Of these studies, only Mutti1s and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson s 
incorporate measures of capital as well as labor displacement. Conceptually, 
capital displacement is no different from labor displacement: when produc­
tion declines, workers are laid off or dismissed, and a certain portion of 
the capital with which labor works also ceases to be used. In practice, 
there are difficulties associated with measuring capital displacement. When 
changes in output are fairly small, adjustments may be effected by altering 
the rate of use of capital: running a plant for ten hours instead^of twelve, 
and so forth; rather than by shutting down machines or plants. Similarly, 
in agriculture, changes may be made by using land, machinery, and such^less 
intensively, rather than by ceasing to use them altogether. True physical 
displacement of capital, analogous to firing a worker, comes only when 
changes in output are large - and to estimate the value of^the capital^dis- 
placed one must know the physical identity of the capital involved, which 
is virtually impossible for an economist studying several manufacturing 
industries simultaneously^. Most authors find it convenient to ignore 
capital displacement; even where it is acknowledged, the problem of iden­
tifying physically displaced capital is evaded by moving directly to^cal 
culating the value of capital’s share of output foregone. Thus Mutti, 
and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson both use measures of capital’s share 
of value added in the displaced output. Mutti uses a straightforward 
estimate of this quantity (Mutti, p. 104); Baldwin et. al. take deprecia­
tion into account, to correct for the fact that adjustment in their 
model is not instantaneous (pp. 15-16).
Since most authors focus solely on labor displacement it is important 
to examine possible extensions of the simple proportional-displacement ^ 
model. Three sorts are encountered in the literature: calculation of inter­
industry effects, including labor displacement in supplying industries; 
calculation of the geographic distribution of displaced labor, including 
interindustry effects; and calculation of the occupational distribution 
of displaced labor, also including interindustry effects. All three
^Szenberg et. al. include a detailed description of the shoemaking 
process and the machinery involved, but unfortunately do not use their 
knowledge to estimate capital displacement.
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extensions are carried out via proportional distribution, so that some 
highly restrictive assumptions underlie the analysis.
Interindustry effects are included in various studies: Salant and 
Vaccara, Mutti, Baldwin and Lewis, and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson.
When total labor displacements are calculated in this manner, assumptions 
of constant costs, rigid wages, and no factor substitutability are impli­
citly extended to all supplying industries.
Labor displacements in directly and indirectly impacted industries 
may then be allocated among either or both regions (states) or occupa­
tional groups by utilizing matrices of proportional distributional data 
once displacement at the national level has been established. Regional or 
state-level changes in employment, by industry, are calculated by first 
allocating displaced output to regions according to each region's share 
in total production (in that industry) in the base year, and then multi­
plying this change by the national average labor-output coefficient for 
that industry. It is thus assumed that there are no regional differences 
in either the composition of the industry^ or the productivity of the 
workforce. This method is used by Baldwin and Lewis, who add to it calcu­
lations of the occupational distribution of displaced workers.
Occupational distributions are measured by multiplying labor displace­
ment by industry (or by industry, by state) by a matrix of occupational 
skill distributions by industry, known as the National Industry Occupational 
Employment Matrix^. Use of this matrix implies the assumption that the 
skills of workers in any industry in a given area are distributed exactly 
as are the skills of workers in the whole industry: e.g. if 10 percent of 
the steel industry's workforce is comprised of clerical workers, then when 
a steel plant in Pennsylvania cuts output (and therefore employment) 
by 25 percent, 10 percent of the displaced workers will be clerical workers. 
There is an obvious danger here of attaining a false impression of accuracy, 
as the mass of information generated obscures the shaky foundations upon 
which the results lie. Only one study of liberalization uses a combined 
regional/occupational breakdown: this is Baldwin and Lewis's; but it has 
been influential in determining public attitudes towards liberalization
r\ r
At the level at which most of these studies are made (never using a 
finer industrial classification than the SIC 4-digit level, so that national 
interindustry tables may be used), there may be considerable differences 
between the output of one state and the output of another.
f\ £
Published periodically by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
^The Congressional Budget Office study of the distributional impact 
of liberalization under the Tokyo Round of MTNs draw heavily from Baldwin 
and Lewis, who find that while changes in employment associated with liber­
alization will be small, they will be unevenly distributed: the Northeast 
will have the greatest losses relative to total employment, while the Mid­
west will enjoy the greatest relative gains (pp. 252-253). Baldwin and 
Lewis's overall picture of the impact of liberalization is reassuring, 
a conclusion transmitted clearly in the CBO report. This report was 
widely quoted in the popular press at the time of its publication. See 
Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office.
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Both regional and occupational breakdowns are used in other studies of the 
distributional impact of government policy^®.
When an industry affected by liberalization is not characterized by 
constant costs, estimation of displacement becomes more complicated. If 
the assumption of rigid wages is retained, displacement should be related 
directly to technological characteristics of the industry. Alternatively, 
it is possible to assume that factor returns are flexible, in which case 
displacements may not occur.
An approach which relates displacement to technology is the use of 
the vintage-capital model(Isard; Katz, in chapter 4 of Jondrow et_. al.) .
In this model^ , capital purchased in a given year is assumed to embody 
a fixed capital-labor ratio: that is, it takes a certain number of workers 
to run the machine, and this number cannot subsequently be changed. The 
overall capital-labor ratio of an Industry changes over time because newer 
capital embodies a higher capital-labor ratio. Once a machine is purchased 
and in place, the variable costs of using it are determined by the wage 
rate (which appears to be exogenously determined, at least in single-industry 
studies). Capital can either be assumed to ’expire’ after a fixed number of 
years, or it can be retired when the variable costs of operating it are too 
high.
28Schluter and Heady estimate labor demand shifts by agricultural 
commodity by region resulting from projected final demands for food and 
fiber in 1980 (pp. 70-79). Frank and Freeman break down net employment 
shifts associated with US direct foreign investment into occupational 
skill groups (pp. 156-158). Haveman and Krutilla use a Leontief balanced 
regional interindustry model to examine regional changes in employment, 
by industry and detailed occupation, arising from the hypothetical con­
struction of each of twelve possible water resource projects in each of 
ten regions (pp. 38-64).
29Isard gives as sources for the theory of vintage capital models 
the following: L, Johansen, ’’Substitution Versus Fixed Production Coef­
ficients in the Theory of Economic Growth: A Synthesis,” Econometrics 27 
(April 1959), 157-176; R. M. Solow, "Substitution and Fixed Proportions in 
the Theory of Capital," Review of Economic Studies 29 (June 1962), 207-218; 
and R. M. Solow, J. Tobin, C. C. von Weizsacker, and M. E. Yaari, "Neoclassi­
cal Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions," Review of Economic Studies 33 
(April 1966), 79-115.
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This model enables the researcher, having once estimated the parameters 
for the industry under study^, to relate output and factor displacement 
to the industry’s stock of capital of different vintages. In theory, 
changes in output come about as a response to price changes: liberalization 
drives down the price of domestic goods^, so that the costs of producing 
with the older machines will exceed returns, and the machines will 
cease to be used. In practice, both authors cited here take the change in 
output as given^, and simply 'assign' it to the oldest vintage capital.
By this means they demonstrate that labor displacement may be as much as 
twice as high in this model as it is in the constant-cost model (Isard, 
pp. 408-409; Jondrow et. al., pp. 4-45, 4-46).
O A
Estimations are done in Isard, pp. 406-409. and in Jondrow etv al^ . , 
pp. 4-27 ff. Neither author is actually very successful in demonstrating 
that the model can fit the industries studied (the U.S. textile industry 
in Isard, the U.S. steel industry in Jondrow et. al.). Isard s results 
suggest that most of the change in labor-output ratios over time is due 
to disembodied changes in efficiency, not to technical change embodied 
in new capital (p. 407). As these results do not conform to his expec­
tations, and since they imply "...little difference between unit labor 
requirements on new and old capital vintages," (p. 408) the author decides 
to proceed on the assumption that technical change is between two-thirds 
and completely embodied. Katz, in Jondrow et. al., indicates that cross- 
sectional relationships between average labor productivity and age-of- 
plant, while moving in the expected directions, "..are seldom statistically 
significant," (p. 4-24) yet clearly wants to believe that they are: "This 
finding, if correct, is highly important for our purposes, since one of the 
consequences of liberalizing imports will undoubtedly be to reduce the 
share of output produced by aging and obsolescent processes" (pp. 4-24, 
4-26). He therefore calculates the "cumulative distribution of output 
and employment by equipment vintages" in the steel industry, 1930 to 
1971 (table 4-5, p. 4-28), and uses the labor/output ratios implied 
therein as upper bounds for estimating displacement, the lower bound 
being the average labor/output ratios (proportional displacement).
31Since this is not a constant-cost industry, a backward shift in 
the demand for the domestic good as a function of its own price yields 
both a change in output and a change in price. See figure 3.
^Katz uses changes in output estimated via a dynamic simulation model 
of the US steel industry (chapter 3 of Jondrow et. AL. )* Isard does not 
actually estimate displacement; his study is designed primarily to ascer­
tain whether the burden of adjustment to liberalized textile imports in 
the US could be lightened by discouraging new investment in the domestic 
textile industry. His point is that by allowing imports to substitute 
for output ’foregone' by not investing in new plant, labor displacements 
would be considerably below the level attained by closing old plants 
(pp. 408-409). Unfortunately, he ignores the possibility of the domestic 
price falling and old plants becoming too costly to operate.
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The vintage-capital model relies on a very explicit capital-displacement 
mechanism (output is decreased by retiring machines of a certain vintage), 
hut neither study mentioned above deals with capital displacement per se.
It would appear that by estimating the expected useful life of each vin­
tage in the absence of liberalization, and comparing it with the life 
realized after liberalization, one could derive some estimate of the 
value of displaced capital.
The vintage-capital model, by relating output displacement to 
identifiable industrial characteristics (age of capital), may lend itself 
to estimation of the regional impact of liberalization in a more accurate 
manner than is permitted by the simple, proportional-displacement inter­
industry model. In chapter 7 of Jondrow's study, Devine and O'Neill 
examine the regional distribution of older steel-making technology (open- 
hearth furnaces) and attempt to relate it to historical regional patterns 
of labor displacement (pp. 7-24 to 7-30). Being moderately successful^, 
they proceed on the assumption that the expected relationship does exist 
to study the probable geographic pattern of labor displacement under 
steel import liberalization (pp. 7-33 to 7-39).
The author's methods are worth reporting here because they illustrate 
the difficulty of justifying empirically the assumption that regional impact 
should correspond to regional distribution of different technologies. Having 
studied technology in the steel industry and related it to costs of produc­
tion (pp. 7-4 to 7-24), the authors hypothesize that a systemmatic rela­
tionship should show up between observed changes in local steel employment 
in a cyclical downturn (1970-71) and the type of furnace used in local 
operations. To test this they construct a sample of 11 states and 4 SMSAs 
in which furnace types of specific plants can be identified and for which 
BLS employment data are available at a sufficiently detailed industry 
level. They then run a simple regression of the form Y - a + bX, with 
Y being the absolute value of the percentage decline in employment and 
X being the percent of capacity in open hearth furnaces, The results are 
poor (Rr - .03), and the authors posit two explanations for this: either 
geographic dispersion of unemployment rates reflects variable costs, but 
furnace type is not a sufficient indicator of variable cost structure; or 
alternatively, unemployment patterns are determined by factors other than 
variable costs, notably either geographic concentrations of cyclically sensi­
tive steel-using industries, or else plant modernizations in which labor is 
displaced by new capital-intensive processes. Having no way to test all 
these possibilities, the authors choose instead to study their three out­
lying observations; doing this reveals that other-than-variable-cost 
factors determine labor displacement in each case. When these three 
observations are discarded, the rises precipitously, from .03 to .52, 
leading the authors to conclude that "(t)he fairly large RZ suggests that 
furnace type may in fact be the dominant determinant of geographic dis­
persion in variable cost" (pp. 7-24 to 7-30).
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As techniques for measuring changes in factor demand have been 
developed almost completely in response to interest in improved evalua­
tion of liberalized trade in manufactured goods, tools for evaluation 
of liberalized agricultural trade are poorly developed. Whereas labor 
displacement is the central issue in manufacturing sectors, most displace­
ment in agricultural production will be reflected in decreased, or less 
efficient, utilization of land and capital. An important area for further 
study is thus the proper measurement of displacement in agricultural 
production.
Factor Displacement: Changes in Supply
As part of the normal workings of the labor market, a certain per­
centage of jobs are regularly vacated by workers leaving voluntarily 
to seek or enter employment elsewhere. One method of effecting dis­
placement in an impacted industry is simply not to fill posts that are 
emptied in this manner.
It is customary, in studies of trade liberalization, to treat 
attrition as a costless form of adjustment (Jondrow et_. ad. ; Brechling) . 
Whether or not this is justifiable depends on whether workers in the 
process of searching for jobs, and potential workers preparing themselves 
for the labor market, suffer any loss on account of the decreased oppor­
tunity. It could be argued that investments in human capital (industry- 
specific training) are forfeited when voluntarily emptied jobs are withdrawn 
from the market; the issue has long been of concern to unions (see Frank,^ 
Jr. chapter 3). However, since these job losses do not require compensation 
and are relatively inconspicuous, they are generally ignored.
Whether or not attrition is properly considered to be costless, it 
is undoubtedly a less costly form of displacement than are firing^and 
laying off. If the determinants of attrition can be understood, it 
theoretically possible to estimate paths of adjustment which will minimize 
adjustment costs (by relying as much as possible on attrition), perhaps 
subject to constraints on the length of time in which liberalization must 
be completed.
Empirically, estimation of attrition may be handled in one of two 
ways. Either the rate of attrition is assumed to be independent of condi­
tions in the industry, or it is assumed to be endogenously determined by 
these conditions.
Exogenous quit rates are implicitly assumed in Jacobson’s study of 
losses incurred by displaced workers in the U.S. steel industry (chapter 
5 in Jondrow et, al.). In order to ascertain by how much Initial estimates 
of labor displacement (demand-induced) should be reduced, the author 
studies the historical experience of workers in steel firms where employ­
ment has either risen or fallen. Workers leaving ’rising firms are 
assumed to do so voluntarily, and serve as a measure of the normal rate 
of attrition. This same rate of attrition is ascribed to workers leaving 
’falling’ firms, so that actual displacements are measured as a residual 
after voluntary quits are subtracted from the calculated change m  demand
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for labor (Jondrow, et. al., ch. 5). By this means the author determines 
that attrition will absorb between 24.2 and 39.0 percent of the separations 
needed to adjust to a lower level of output following liberalization^ .
Jacobson's results here may be compared with Brechling's simulation 
analysis of labor turnover in U.S. durable-goods and nondurable-goods 
industries, in which both exogenous and endogenous quit rates are employed. 
Brechling finds that when attritions are assumed to respond to economic 
conditions they drop sharply: from 79 percent with exogenous quits to a 
high of 43 percent^5 with endogenous quits (p. 68). The author summarizes 
the implications of his research for the analysis of trade impact as follows
(p. 68):
...The failure of unreplaced attritions to bring about 
much of the net reduction in employment occurs in spite 
of the large reductions in new hires and is- due to the 
sharp decline in voluntary quits. In other words, a 
decline in the demand for an industry's output and, 
hence, for labor discourages attritions so strongly that, 
despite large reductions in replacements, the level of 
unreplaced attritions cannot rise much...
...(R)esults suggest that the extent to which costless 
unreplaced attritions can bring about net reductions in 
employment may be quite limited and this conclusion may 
well be at variance with the views held commonly by labor 
economists.
Despite Brechling's pessimism, his results do suggest that a 
significant portion of projected displacement may in fact be absorbed 
by voluntary quits, and a large portion of potential adjustment costs 
avoided. Studies which fail to account for possible attrition may thus 
overestimate the magnitude of actual labor displacement caused by trade 
liberalization and consequently overstate associated adjustment costs.
Adjustment Costs
Adjustment costs are, roughly, the costs that accrue either explicitly 
or implicitly to factors displaced by liberalization-induced shifts in
34 1Rates are estimated separately by age-tenure group - hence a range
of values.
33Attrition accounted for 42.9 percent of the change in employment 
in durable-goods industries, and 27.8 percent in nondurables (p. 85).
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output . The measure is rough because all possible costs are not 
accounted for: coverage in the empirical literature is restricted to 
costs arising from price rigidities, with numerous private costs being 
ignored.
Two major motivations prompt the calculations of adjustment costs. 
The first is to provide a figure that can be compared with the welfare 
gains from trade to ascertain whether liberalization leads to a poten­
tial Pareto improvement: that is, whether total social gains exceed 
total social losses. This is primarily an economist’s exercise, as 
what is at stake is a test of the classical ’optimality of free trade’ 
doctrine (e.g., Magee). The second: to measure the impact of liberali­
zation in terms of quantitative and qualitative changes in employment, 
and in associated losses of income, is more liberal, or even explicitly 
political. This may be done out of sympathy for labor, out of a need 
to estimate what actual compensable losses (under trade adjustment 
assistance legislation) might be, or simply out of a desire thoroughly 
to examine the distributional impact of liberalization.
In theory, one must distinguish between the private and social, or 
welfare, costs of adjusting to liberalization. The costs commonly 
measured in empirical studies approximate social costs, but since private 
costs overlap with social ones the former are in practice partly measured 
as well.
In the neoclassical framework, with perfectly flexible wages and 
prices, full factor employment, and instantaneous adjustment (perfect 
factor mobility), social adjustment costs do not exist (Baldwin, Mutti 
and Richardson, pp. 12-14). The latter arise through ’distortions’, 
being most commonly attributed to rigid wages (as in the following 
example), though numerous other factors impede adjustment as well 
Private costs, however, can exist with or without price ^ rigidities.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem demonstrates that under liberalization
the real wages of the scarce factor of production fall, even though
^There is no conceptual distinction between trade-induced displace­
ment , with its associated adjustment costs, and displacement resulting 
from the ’normal' workings of a market economy. As conservatives like 
to point out, if one supports trade adjustment assistance it is incon­
sistent not to support general industrial adjustment assistance as well 
(which is anathema to conservatives). Trade adjustment assistance is 
generally acknowledged to be politically motivated; as one writer 
sympathetic to labor points out, "...(a)djustment assistance has been 
primarily a device to pass trade bills, a function it helped to perform 
on two occasions" (Mitchell, p. 73).
37Some of these are factor Immobility, institutional impediments to 
workers voluntarily retraining themselves for available jobs (e.g., 
unavailability of credit for this purpose), and monopolistic and monopsonis— 
tic producer behavior.
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the usual neoclassical assumptions hold ; hence even if labor is never 
unemployed, a real wage change follows liberalization and must be counted 
a private loss.
Since the U.S. economy is generally believed to be characterized by 
rigid wages (in manufacturing) in the short run, or over the period 
during which adjustments are made"5 , social as well as private costs are 
created by liberalization. Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson demonstrate 
graphically the origins of social, or welfare, costs under rigid pricing 
in the imperfect-substitution model, incidentally illustrating the 
degree^o which social and private costs may overlap, with the following 
figure4' .
FIGURE 5. MEASURING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF ADJUST­
MENT IN THE DOMESTIC GOODS MARKET OF 
A CONSTANT-COST INDUSTRY WHEN WAGES 
ARE RIGID
o  Q
W. F. Stolper and P. A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages,"
Review of Economic Studies 9 (November 1941): 58-73.
39Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, p. 15. The authors point out 
further that returns to capital may also be inflexible, contrary to the 
usual assumptions, since 11. . . (w)idespread and well-known product pricing 
practices, such as marking up on variable costs...can make returns to 
ownership of "capital" residually rigid in the short run, too, in indus­
tries with limited ability to substitute physical capital for labor" (p. 15).
^°This figure is taken directly from Baldwin,, Mutti and Richardson, 
p. 13.
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In this figure, the authors attempt to measure in the domestic 
goods market the social costs (as reflected by factor costs) of liberali­
zation under rigid factor pricing (but with long-run constant costs as 
well). They apparently assume that all revenue goes to factor payments 
(there are no pure profits, and material costs are omitted).
The situation depicted in figure 5 is described as follows. Freer 
trade in the import good causes demand for the domestic good to fall 
from to D' . If affected factors of production will accept lower ^  
wages,Qthe cost of production (and the supply curve) falls from to 
The change in output is measured by AD; factors displaced by this change 
lose income measured by IFCB, while retained factors lose P^P^FI . Both
these losses are private losses: the whole rectangle P^P^CB is equivalent
to consumer surplus realized as the price falls, so that (in a conventional 
welfare-economics framework) no net social costs arise. Displaced factors 
are assumed to be instantly reemployed elsewhere at the new, lower wage 
also received by retained factors and equivalent to the new value of their 
marginal product. The wage differential persists for all factors but 
continues to be a private loss.
Under rigid pricing, however, welfare costs do arise. When demand 
falls, there is no accommodating shift in factor prices, so that not 
only is the change in output greater than under flexible factor prices 
(by the amount ED), but output prices do not decline. The loss in wages, 
which now accrues only to displaced factors (retained factors earn a 
monopoly rent of P^P^HG, an amount which under flexible prices goes to
consumers), is equivalent in each time period to HGCB. Since this amount 
is not matched by a comparable consumer gain, it constitutes a welfare 
loss.
HGCB is actually the minimum possible welfare loss under a regime 
of rigid factor pricing. It is assumed that displaced factors will be 
reemployed to produce other goods valued at GEAC The authors point
out that ",..(i)f no alternative goods at all can be produced by the 
released resources (there is no similar employment available, or the costs 
of readapting are greater than the returns from any new employment) 
unemployment will be maximal, and the welfare costs of adjustment to 
the society will approach HEAB" (p. 14).
There are thus two sorts of welfare costs which arise from rigid 
pricing in this model. The first, measured by HGCB, corresponds to
^ I n  a partial-equilibrium framework it is impossible to say how 
far wages and output prices will actually fall.
^2This implies that elsewhere in the economy wages are competitively 
set, and that 1 aberrant1 behavior in one industry is not influential 
enough to alter the behavior of wages elsewhere. This contradicts the 
authors' stated assumption that the IJ.S. economy is characterized by 
rigid wages. The 'competitive1 wage level must be regarded as one which 
would obtain in the absence of all rigidities.
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unemployment costs. The second, measured by some portion of GEAC, 
corresponds to what is usually termed the permanent wage loss or wage 
differential. The magnitudes of these costs are determined by both 
the initial levels of displacement and by the persistence of displace­
ment over time.
In practice, what costs are identified and measured, and how do they 
correspond with the areas described above? Measured costs included wages 
actually lost during unemployment, the differential between observed pre- 
and post-liberalization wages, and the loss in returns to capital. All 
these costs are measured directly from observed wages, not from the 
domestic product market in the manner depicted in figure 5; it is u^lear 
to what extent estimated social costs correspond to theorized costs 
What is_ clear is that, empirically, the only costs which anyone attempts 
to measure are those that approximate social costs. A whole set of 
private costs: relocation and retraining expenseslosses in value of 
workers’ capital assets (e.g., land and houses) when heavily localized 
changes depress property values, consequent property tax losses to the 
community, community multiplier effects following from lost income and 
outmigration, and the psychological costs borne by displaced workers and 
their families; is ignored. These are costs which would be difficult 
to estimate, but the lack of interest shown in them is indicative of the 
fact that trade economists have yet to transcend the limited framework 
provided by the welfare model.
The simplest approach to calculating adjustment costs is that which 
treats only wages lost to unemployed labor, ignoring both capital losses 
and permanent wage differentials. At the most basic level, no informa­
tion about labor force characteristics or differences in wages paid to 
different workers is used. Magee uses such an approach. Having calculated 
long-run labor displacement in each of the aggregate sectors defined in 
his study, he assigns one-fifth of the total to each of the five years 
following hypothetical liberalization^. He then assumes average durations
4JIf rigid product prices arise from oligopolistic behavior rather 
than from cost structures, the area HGCB may not be completely or even 
mostly comprised of factor wage losses: it may contain a large element 
of rent. The area will still correspond to a loss of consumer surplus, 
but empirical estimates equating observed wage losses with social costs 
may be too low. In addition, the use of the observed post-liberaliza­
tion wage as a proxy for the value of displaced labor's marginal product 
may seriously bias estimation if most of the economy is characterized by 
noncompetitive pricing practices.
^Magee assumes a time path for changes in output rather than forcing 
them to occur instantaneously. He does not do the same for welfare gaips; 
the prices of imports are assumed to fall instantaneously after liberali­
zation, permitting welfare gains to accrue immediately and in full. He 
simply assumes that domestic industries will need five years to adjust 
to "a new long-run equilibriumn (Magee, p. 680).
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of unemployment in each sector, calculates the average annual wage in 
each sector, multiplies the wages by the appropriate durations, and 
takes the present value of the total. He does not attempt to capture 
the permanent wage differential.
Both Mutti, and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson attempt to relate 
the duration of unemployment to the socioeconomic characteristics of 
displaced workers, assuming, however, that the displaced workforce 
possesses the same socioeconomic characteristics as the retained work­
force. Their procedure begins by assigning to displaced workers the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the whole labor force of the industry 
in question‘d. The average duration of unemployment for all displaced 
workers is then calculated via a regression equation plating the dura­
tion of unemployment to socioeconomic characteristics . The average 
duration of unemployment is then multiplied by the average full-time 
daily wage (Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, p. 19) or the current wage 
plus fringe benefits (Mutti, p. 104) to obtain unemployment costs per 
worker. Neither author estimates the permanent wage differential.
Since layoffs are likely disproportionately to affect young workers, 
females, and those with low seniority, and since these groups are 
generally paid lower wages than are retained workers, assuming both 
average socioeconomic composition and average wages for displaced workers 
may "...overstate income losses due to adjustment and dislocation 
(Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, p. 18). Szenberg, Lombardi and Lee 
attempt to take into account differences in the compositions of the dis­
placed and retained workforces, and in the wages earned by each, to 
measure both wages lost during unemployment and the permanent wage 
differential suffered by displaced workers in the U.S. footwear industry.
Using data from McCarthy’s study of adjustment assistance in the 
Massachusetts shoe industry (McCarthy), the authors partition displaced
^These characteristics can be obtained from the Census of Popula
Lion.
^Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson use an equation from the Department 
of Labor (source not further specified) which relates "...the number of 
days unemployed before obtaining (the) first post-layoff job., to age 
in years, sex, race (white or nonwhite), and years of education (p. 18). 
Mutti uses results from Bale’s dissertation (Malcolm Bale, Adjustment 
to Freer Trade: An Economic Analysis of the Adjustment Assistance Pro­
visions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Wisconsin, 1973) to relate duration of unemployment to 
sex, age, status as household head, past wage, education, and the local 
unemployment rate (p. 105). Baldwin et. al. do not report estimated^ 
durations; Mutti's range from 12.1 to 15.0 weeks for the five industries 
directly affected (p. 106).
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workers into permanently and temporarily unemployed^yorkers, and estimate 
separately the adjustment costs borne by each group . Losses borne by 
the permanently unemployed (those who never find another job) are cal­
culated by taking the product of the average number of years remaining 
to each worker until retirement is reached, and the average wage of this 
group before displacement. Since the average wage of this group, which 
is fairly close to retirement, is below the average wage for other workers, 
this portion of unemployment is less 'costly' than the others.
The temporarily unemployed bear costs through both their initial 
unemployment and their subsequent reemployment at a lower average 
wage. The unemployment cost is calculated as the product of the average 
duration of unemployment and the average wage for this group; the per­
manent wage loss is calculated as the present value of the average differ­
ence between pre- and post-liberalization wages for this group, extended^ 
over the average number of years remaining until retirement (pp. 88-89)
Szenberg, Lombardi and Lee!s estimated costs suggest that the per­
manent wage differential comprises a large share of total'adjustment 
costs. From their results one may calculate that costs are divided 
as follows:
(a) wage loss of the permanently unemployed
(b) wage loss of the temporarily unemployed
(c) permanent wage differential...........
.43.2%
.15.9
.40.9
100.0%
^McCarthy studied the actual experiences of displaced workers in the 
Massachusetts shoe industry, so that his work shows the age and sex com­
position of displaced workers, their wage levels before and after dis­
placement, and a variety of other data. All of Szenberg, Lombardi and 
Lee's distributional data come from McCarthy.
^Szenberg et. al. do not use most of the information about displaced 
workers available in McCarthy's study; it is interesting to see what 
McCarthy's own results suggest about the distribution of adjustment costs 
among workers. McCarthy finds that the group of workers which failed to 
regain employment was on the average older and more heavily female than 
the rest of the labor force, had slightly lower education and skill 
levels, and lower pre-impact wages (McCarthy, p. 88). McCarthy character­
izes them as "near—retirees or secondary wage earners," and adds that 
their failure to seek reemployment was based on discouragement rather 
than on disinterest.
Of those who'became reemployed, reemployment experiences varied 
markedly with different socioeconomic characteristics. Most startling 
is McCarthy's finding that men, on average, actually increased their 
real wages upon reemployment, though for 'all workers' post-impact wages 
were lowered; the burden of adjustment clearly fell on the female 
workers in the shoe industry (pp. 114-118). His results are far too 
extensive to summarize here, but they are well worth reviewing if one 
is interested in the finer points of the impact of liberalization and 
adjustment assistance on an industrial workforce.
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The permanent wage differential is ithus large, suggesting that studies which 
neglect to include it may significantly underestimate social adjustment 
costs.
The permanent wage differential is considerably larger in Jacobson's 
study of adjustment costs in the steel industry (chapter 5 in Jondrow 
et. al.). Jacobson's approach is certainly the most sophisticated in 
the trade-impact literature. Using historical observations of employment 
patterns in the steel industry, the author establishes both the age-tenure 
characteristics of displaced workers over time (as employment reductions 
continue s different groups are displaced sequentially) and earnings pro­
files, by age-tenure group, of displaced workers throughout their unemploy­
ment and subsequent reemployment (see pp. 5-2 to 5-3 for a succinct 
description of his methods). Both unemployment costs and permanent wage 
losses are therefore measured separately for each age-tenure groups and 
displacements, rather than falling in equal proportions on all groups 
of workers, are allocated selectively to mirror observed layoff patterns 
in the industry.
The relative magnitudes of the costs attributable to unemployment 
and to lifetime earnings losses obtained by Jacobson are startling•
For all displaced workers taken together, earnings losses in the first 
year (when most unemployment occurs) comprise only 10.8 percent of the 
total lifetime loss. Losses over the next four years comprise 40.6 per­
cent of the total, with losses thereafter comprising the remaining 48.6 
percent (pp. 5-119, 5-120 Permanent wage losses in the steel industry 
apparently comprise almost 90 percent of total adjustment costs, a 
startlingly high figure in view of the fact that so many authors are 
content to use wages lost during unemployment as a measure of the total 
labor costs of adjustment (e.g., Muttij Magee; Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson).
Inspection of differences in the compositions of the labor forces in 
the U.S. steel and footwear industries suggest that the relative size of 
the permanent wage differential may be found to vary in response to two 
important factors: the proportion of older workers in the displaced work­
force, and the proportion of women and minorities displaced. The greater 
the numbers of older, nonwhite, or female workers displaced, the lower 
should be the relative size of the permanent income differential.
^Jacobson's figures show that the burdens borne by different cate 
gories of displaced workers vary significantly. In the first five years 
following displacement, young workers with low tenure tend to lose the 
least, both in the first and subsequent years. Young workers with higher 
tenure (more than one year) tend to lose more than does any older group, 
although losses incurred by workers ages 29-40 with high tenure (over 3 
years) may be fairly similar. Lastly, prime-age workers (ages 29-40) 
with less than 3 years' tenure actually gain income by being displaced, 
at least after the first year (Jacobson, p. 5-43). This is consistent 
with McCarthy’s finding that displaced males in the Massachusetts shoe 
industry, on average, were reemployed at a higher wage than they had 
received prior to displacement (see fn. 48).
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The role of displaced older workers here is fairly obvious. Older 
workers are more likely than others to remain unemployed after displace­
ment; even if reemployed, the duration of employment following displace­
ment will be short compared to that of younger workers, while the spell 
of unemployment is likely to be comparatively long. The costs associated 
with displacing older workers will be primarily unemployment costs.
The presence of female and minority workers in the displaced workforce 
will tend to lower the relative size of the permanent income differential 
because the time profiles of these groups' earnings differ considerably 
from that characterizing the experience of whitemales. The typical white 
male’s earnings, historically, have risen rapidly in the early years of 
employment and then continued to rise, more gradually, until sometime in 
middle age (45-54 years), after which they decline. The earnings of 
females and minorities, however, have tended to remain quite static over 
the worker's lifetime (Hall, pp. 393-394). These earnings profiles 
are sketched in figure 6. Wage increases for white males are tied to 
experience and on-the-job training (which tend to be positively correlated 
with age); when a white male is displaced and subsequently reemployed
FIGURE 6. MEASUREMENT OF THE PERMANENT WAGE LOSS FOR 
WHITE MALES, MINORITIES, AND WHITE FEMALES
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1 as if' he were younger or less experienced, he returns to a lower wage 
level and, in effect, never quite catches up to his peers. The change 
will be less pronounced for women and minorities, whose experience and 
training seem to count for little in the labor market. The magnitude 
of the losses suffered by members of the two groups are indicated roughly 
by the shaded areas in figure 6.
As this crudely outlined model suggests, the permanent income 
differential would tend to be relatively large in an industry with a 
homogeneously white male workforce, and relatively small in an industry 
with disproportionate numbers of older, female, or minority workers.
The 1970 Census of Population shows that while white males comprised 
62.3 percent of the manufacturing labor force in 1970, they comprised 
73.6 percent of the labor force in "all metal industries", and just 36.1 
percent in the manufacture of other-than-rubber footwear50. These data 
suggest that Szenberg, Lombardi and Lee's estimate of the relative size 
of the permanent wage differential (AO.9 percent of total costs), being 
based on a disproportionately female and minority workforce, might serve 
as a lower bound; while Jacobson's estimate of almost 90 percent, based 
on a disproportionately white-male labor force, might serve as an upper 
bound. Failurd to include the permenent wage differential in cost esti­
mates may introduce a serious bias into the evaluation of the social 
costs of liberalization.
Because the literature places such a strong emphasis on labor adjust- 
ment costs, capital costs have been either ignored or dealt with summarily, 
as by Mutti and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson (see the discussion of capital 
displacement on p. 24 of this paper). Yet the estimation of capital costs 
should be paid more attention, if only because the owners of capital will 
constitute a vocal lobby if they perceive liberalization as a threat.
The problem here lies in separating social from private costs. Social 
costs, as shown above, arise from price rigidities and other distortions 
of the neoclassical model. In the manufacturing sector, where both factor 
and output prices are believed to be rigid, spells of unemployment are con­
ventionally attributed to these rigidities, and the permanent wage differ­
ential constitutes a social cost, as well as a private one, because it 
measures consumer surplus foregone through rigid pricing.
When liberalization decreases domestic output, capital displacement 
can take two forms. Either capital can be retained in its former employ­
ment and utilized at a lower rate, or it can be physically 'displaced' and, 
if possible, used in another activity. When adjustment takes place 
through less intensive utilization, the change in returns to capital is
5Q1970 Census of Population, Vol. 1, Part 1-Sec.2, table 236. 
"All metal industries" is used here because Census classifications 
do not permit separation of steel fabricating industries from other 
metal fabricating industries.
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analogous to unemployment costs; Mutti and Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson, 
by measuring the capital cost as the change in capital’s share of value 
added, thereby measure an unemployment cost. But what happens when 
capital cannot be reemployed, or can only be reemployed at a lower return? 
These situations arise not because of distortions in the economy but 
because of the inflexible nature of capital itself. Land suited to 
growing grains, for instance, has little value in other activities; 
a loom is not much use for anything except making textiles. It may be, 
then, that losses of this sort are not properly social costs, and should 
not be counted as such.
At the same time, they cannot possibly be ignored, because they 
clearly affect the welfare of identifiable groups in the economy. Even 
if capital losses are not social losses, and need not be subtracted from 
welfare gains, they must be considered. But if they are, then what of 
the many private costs accruing to labor, and to communities, which are 
also conventionally ignored?
The narrowness of welfare analysis suggests that any useful approach 
to measuring the distributional impact of liberalization may have to 
venture onto shakier ground. Too much is omitted from the various 
studies discussed above. In the final and summary section criticisms 
of partial-equilibrium analysis of the impact of liberalization are 
raised, and alternatives to both methods of measurement and methods of 
evaluation are considered.
IV. SUMMARY
Many criticisms have been raised in the preceding review of models 
and empirical methods of partial-equilibrium analysis of liberalization. 
It has been shown that transfers in themodel are poor indicators of the 
actual redistributive effects of liberalization, and that moving from 
estimation of aggregate consumer and producer surpluses to measurement 
of the costs and benefits accruing to real entities may be difficult.
The failure of the static instantaneous-liberalization model to capture 
some important effects of staged liberalization has been demonstrated. 
The problems of defining and estimating adjustment costs have been 
covered. But where does this lead? What can now be said about the 
advantages or limitations of evaluating the impact of liberalization 
in this manner?
It appears that three generalizations may be made about this model 
as an empirical tool. The first is that if welfare (or efficiency) 
effects, in the sense of potential Pareto improvements, are to be 
measured, estimation of social adjustment costs (which are subtracted 
from gains in surplus) can be improved. The second is that if distri­
butional effects are of primary interest, the model provides a good 
starting point but yields little information about real income-distri­
butive effects, and none at all about the private costs associated with 
change. The third is that formal comparisons between efficiency and 
equity effects are precluded by the apparent exclusion from the model of 
major equity effects.
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Wlth respect to the first point, it was shown that measurement of 
social adjustment costs in the literature is often inadequate, four 
major sources of bias were found, These are the failure to let attrition 
offset decreased factor demand, the failure to account for possible 
greater-than-proportional labor displacement (and less-than-proportional 
capital displacement), the failure to include in factor costs a permanent 
income differential, and the failure to count capital costs. Thus even 
within the welfare framework estimations can be greatly improved,
However, as was also shown, the welfare effects of liberalization 
are small in comparison with the income-distributional effects. Perhaps 
as a consequence of the growing realization that distributional effects 
are what really interest the electorate, and hence their representatives, 
one observes in the literature a secular trend away from concern with 
welfare gains and towards an interest in distribution, In the^earller 
literature (e.g., Dardis and Learn) the focus is entirely on simple wel­
fare gains, adjustment costs being omitted on the assumption that no signifi­
cant distortions exist. In the next stage, exemplified by Magee, adjust­
ment costs are accorded a cursory treatment, but the focus remains on 
efficiency. It is in the post-Magee literature that interest in distribution 
blossoms, Johnson looks specifically at transfers, rather than welfare 
gains, in his study; Szenberg, Lombardi and Lee use McCarthy’s study to 
refine their estimates of adjustment costs but also, it appears, to 
increase the informational content of their study; and in the extreme 
cases, Baldwin and Lewis, and Jondrow at. al., measure the distribution 
of gains and losses across industries (Baldwin and Lewis), regions (both), 
and categories of workers (both). These extensions of the model could 
(with the exception of regional impact studies) be 'justified’ as 
attempts to refine the estimation of adjustment costs in order to improve 
estimates of welfare gains, but this is not really how they are presented 
in the studies. There is, quite clearly, a growiug interest in the distri­
butional impact of policy changes. Perhaps the best illustration of this 
is the fact that after Bale and Greenshields published their estimates 
of the pure efficiency costs of Japanese agricultural, production and trade 
programs (Bale and Greenshields, 1978), Bale had an apparent change of 
heart and wrote a separate paper pointing out, rather apologetically, 
that the transfers implicit in the model were "a,.often more than ten 
times the size of the net social losses" (Bale, p. 349),
If distributional issues are of concern, improvements can be made 
both in their measurement and their evaluation. With respect to 
measurement, perhaps the most pressing issues are identifying ways to 
estimate the 'true' income-distributive impact of liberalization, 
both in a static framework and with staged change, and improving the 
measurement of both social and private adjustment costs. In studying 
liberalization of agricultural trade, treatment of both of these issues 
should be facilitated by the wealth of information available about owner­
ship, sources of labor, types of capital, factor returns, and patterns 
of consumption by income class.
The evaluation of distributional effects may be approached in two 
ways, either within the framework of the welfare model or in a less 
constrained manner. Outside the model, there are two routes one may take. 
The first is simply to present clearly and concisely estimates of the
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various changes which occur under liberalization , and leave the 
problem of comparison to policy makers or the electorate. The second 
is to ascertain (from interviews, records of hearings, extant legisla­
tion^) which distributional issues are of greatest interest to policy 
makers, and analyze these in detail. In the wake of a policy change it 
is possible, as Rausser and Freebairn have demonstrated, to estimate 
policy—makers1 preferences between a limited number of distributional 
outcomes. Ex ante, it is possible to calculate what a range of distri­
butional outcomes might be if preferences are allowed to vary within 
reasonable limits.
Within the framework of the welfare model, evaluation of distribu­
tional effects is necessarily based on incomplete information. As has 
been shown, the distributional impact of liberalization is only sketchily 
measured within the partial-equilibrium model. If one then seeks to 
arrive at a single summary measure of the impact of■liberalization via, 
for instance, varying the weights attached to incomes received by different 
groups within the model, many distributional effects will be ignored. 
Examination of equity-efficiency tradeoffs (see, e.g., Weisbrod; McGuire 
and Garn; Harberger) will be impeded by the impossibility of including 
distributional effects lacking in formal economic significance but 
possessed of ample social and political importance.
In summary, then, the characteristics of partial-equilibrium models 
of trade liberalization, and the results of empirical work based in part 
or in toto on these models, are such as to indicate that measurement 
of the distributional impact of trade calls for both a solid theoretical 
base and a good dose of judgement and compassion. Partial-equilibrium 
models serve well as organizational tools and as vehicles for a partial 
evaluation of trade impact, but are poorly suited to detecting many 
social and private costs and benefits associated with change.
51This method is praised by Weisbrod (pp. 185-190) as the simplest 
method of policy analysis.
52Rausser and Freebairn describe the process of studying methods and 
goals of policy-making (pp. 438-441).
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